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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
Case No. 880406-CA
Priority No. 2

ANDREW R. QUINTANA,
Defendant/Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
The Statement of the Issues, Statement of the Case, and
Statement of the Facts are set forth in Brief of Appellant at pages
vi through 8.

Appellant takes this opportunity to respond briefly

to the State's answer.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Because identification was the critical issue in the
case, the prosecutorfs comment in his opening statement that his
witness identified Mr. Quintanta as the man in the alley, despite a
court order suppressing that evidence, probably influenced the
jury's decision and thereby demands reversal of the convictions.
The State failed to provide sufficient evidence that
Mr. Quintana committed the crimes of Burglary and Theft.
The giving of Instruction No. 19 over objection was
without factual basis and eliminated the State's burden to prove
each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt contrary to due
process standards.

The State relies on cases which are

distinguishable from the case at bar.

ARGUMENT

POINT I. THE PROSECUTOR'S MISCONDUCT PREJUDICED
MR, QUINTANA'S RIGHT TO A FUNDAMENTALLY FAIR TRIAL
REQUIRING REVERSAL OF HIS CONVICTIONS,
The State concedes that the prosecutor inappropriately
introduced to the jurors through his opening statement the
previously suppressed identification of Mr. Quintana by Mr. Rains.
Brief of Respondent at 12. Notably, the State does not challenge
the correctness of the trial court's decision granting the motion to
suppress that identification.

Rather, the State claims that the

prosecutor's error was harmless.

Brief of Respondent at 12.

The State contends that the prosecutor's behavior must be
tolerated because (1) jurors were informed that statements by
counsel are not evidence and (2) substantial evidence to support the
conviction was established at trial.

Brief of Respondent at 15-16.

Both arguments fail to squarely analyze the facts of this case under
the standard announced by the Utah Supreme Court for determining
whether reversal is required.
State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984), is dispositive
of this issue.

In Troy, the Supreme Court found that a prosecutor's

opening statement comments attacking the defendant's use of an alias
(his former legal name) and his involvement in a federal witness
protection program called the jurors' attention to matters outside
the evidence.

icL at 485-86.

Notably, the fact that the trial

court expressly admonished the jurors to disregard the particular
statements, as opposed to the generalized instruction by the court
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in this case, was not curative of the error; nor should it be here.
Such admonitions do not play a role in the analysis established by
the Court.1
Next, the Troy Court examined the second prong of the
test—whether the jurors, under the circumstances of the particular
case, probably were influenced by the improper remarks—and
clarified the test.

The Court indicated that step two requires an

examination of the circumstances of the case as a whole.
P.2d at 486.

Troy, 688

The Court noted:

If proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the
challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed
prejudicial. Likewise, in a case with less
compelling proof, this Court will more closely
scrutinize the conduct. If the conclusion of the
jurors is based on their weighing conflicting
evidence or evidence susceptible of differing
interpretations, there is greater likelihood that
they will be improperly influenced through remarks
of counsel. Indeed, in such cases, the jurors may
be searching for guidance in weighing and
interpreting the evidence. They may be especially
susceptible to influence, and a small degree of
influence may be sufficient to affect the verdict.
Id. (quotations and citations omitted).

Critically important in the

Court's explanation is that no deference is given to the jury's
verdict; rather, the more conflicting the evidence and/or the more

1 The Court ruled in Troy that the first prong was
clearly met. 688 P.2d at 486. The comments of the prosecutor in
Troy are less egregious than those at issue here. Here the comments
directly identified criminality rather than merely inferencing
suggestively criminal behavior as in Troy. Perhaps more
importantly, here the prosecutor's comments violated a pretrial
suppression order; no such orders were at issue in Troy. Arguably,
this distinction alone should encourage this Court to avoid
tolerating the prosecutor's behavior allowing a finding that
Mr. Quintana did not receive a fair trial as guaranteed by due
process strictures.
- 3 -

susceptible the evidence is of differing interpretations, then the
greater the likelihood of influence by the remarks.

Accordingly,

the State's analysis of this second prong of the test erroneously
references their second point addressing the sufficiency of the
evidence.

When examining the sufficiency of the evidence, it is

proper that the evidence be viewed in the light most favorable to
the jury verdict, including reasonable inferences.
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

See, e.g.,

When analyzing the

second prong of Troy, the proper view is to focus on the
susceptibility of the evidence to differing interpretations.

If the

evidence arguably supports either position—innocence or guilt—then
the comments at issue may tip the balance inappropriately affecting
the jury's decision and mandating reversal.

Troy, 688 P.2d at

486-87.
Under the circumstances of this particular case, the
second prong is met such that jurors were likely affected by the
prosecutor's improper statement that Mr. Rains had seen Mr. Quintana
come out of the alley behind the John home with something tucked
underneath his shirt.

This case is an identification case as

unquestionably conceded by all.

The prosecutor stated, "The

ultimate issue in this case is, of course, whether or not [the
person Mr. Rains followed] was the defendant" (R. 118 at 20). Later
he again stated, "The only real issue in this particular case seems
to be the question of who is responsible for that criminal conduct
[—the Burglary and Theft]" (R. 119 at 73). The defense attorney
stated, "When the question is identification, how prejudiced can a
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defendant get when Mr. Jones tells the jury that Mr. Rains saw the
defendant.

I can't say it any more bluntly than that.

The question

is identification" (R. 118 at 21). In its brief, the State also
concedes the point by stating, "The major issue before the jury and
now on appeal is simply identification."

Brief of Respondent at 18.

Therefore, when the prosecutor, contrary to the trial
court's suppression order, impermissibly informed the jury that his
witness saw Mr. Quintana in that alley with something under his
shirt, the jurors heard information they were not entitled to hear
which probably influenced their verdict.

The jurors were probably

influenced by the remarks they were not justified in hearing because
those remarks provided the critical connection that no other witness
or evidence could provide.
Mrs. Rains, even assuming her testimony to be credible,
could only place Mr. Quintana on the front porch; she could not
place him either in the premises nor with stolen property (R. 118 at
56-80).

The most damaging physical evidence presented at the trial

was the patch cords.

The testimony introduced by opposing sides on

this issue was, at a minimum, conflicting and susceptible of
different interpretations such that the improper remarks of the
prosecutor likely came into play and tipped the balance permitting
the jury to more readily accept the State's version and return
convictions on the charges.
Finally, an examination of the State's arguments on the
sufficiency of the evidence encounters all the inferences and
explanations the jury must have made to return guilty verdicts:
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i.e., discrepancies in physical description, clothing colors,
automobile license plate discrepancy, broken versus missing front
grill on the truck, difficulties with recalling the basis of ability
to identify Mr. Quintana, difficulties with physical capacities to
identify, etc.)

Brief of Respondent at 19-20.

The jury could have

easily decided the other way on any or all of these considerations.
Therefore, the critical and determinative difference was the
statement of the prosecutor providing actual identification which
was erroneously before the jurors and which they probably used for
"guidance in weighing and interpreting the evidence."
486.

Troy, 688 at

Accordingly, reversal of Mr. Quintana's convictions are

required under State v. Troy.

POINT II. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTIONS OF
MR. QUINTANA.
Despite conceding the critical issue of the case to be
identification (Brief of Respondent at 18), the State maintains that
the facts sufficiently support the convictions against
Mr. Quintana.

The State relies heavily on the testimony of

Mrs. Rains, the presence of the patch cords in the pickup truck
belonging to Mr. Quintana's brother, and various inferences from the
evidence.

Such reliance is misplaced and inadequate to sustain the

convictions.
Mr. Quintana insists that his opening brief adequately
challenges the sufficiency of evidence.

He responds here only to

clarify several points presented by the State.

- 6 -

The State claims that Mrs. Rains recognized the defendant
and his truck.
68).

Brief of Respondent at 19 (citing R. 118 at 59-61,

The record belies that claim.
Additionally, the State claims that Mrs. Rains saw

Mr. Quintana often on her way to work and specifically a few days
prior to the crime.
68-70).

Brief of Respondent at 19 (citing R. 118 at

Again, the record belies the claim.

When more closely

examined, the record on this point supports the inaccuracy of
Mrs. Rains1 identification.
While defense counsel's initial question focused on prior
to the crime, Mrs. Rains did not respond that she saw him two or
three days before the crime; she stated she saw him "two or three
days ago," meaning before the trial (R. 118 at 69). Counsel
carefully clarified that response.
Q. . . . When was the last time, prior to that,
that you had seen the person that you thought was
Andy Quintana?
A. Oh, maybe a few days ago, because I drive up
and down.
Q.

Two or three days ago?

A.

Two or three days ago.

Q. Where was this place that you thought you saw
Andy Quintana two or three days ago?
A.

On 9th West.

Q.

9th West?

(R. 118 at 69)

Mrs. Rains could not have seen Mr. Quintana two or three days before
the trial because he was not out on bail; he was incarcerated at the
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Utah State Prison (R. 04, 39, 42, 44, 45, 47). 2 As the Utah Supreme
Court recognized in State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 490 (Utah 1986),
"[T]he accuracy of an identification is at times inversely related
to the confidence with which it is made."

Moreover, Mrs. Rains'

testimony can be likened to that of Mrs. H. in State v. Walker, 743
P.2d 191 (Utah 1987), where the Supreme Court noted that "her
testimony exhibited a strong motivation to distort her
recollection . . . in order to ensure [the] conviction[s] ."

_I_d. at

197.
Finally, the State finds it interesting that Mr. Quintana
failed in his opening brief to acknowledge in either .the facts or
the argument the "plausible explanation of identification" offered
by Mrs. Rains.

Brief of Respondent at 19 n.5.

It is the State's

characterization of Mrs. Rains1 alternative explanations of
identification as "plausible" wherein the dispute lies.

"Plausible"

is defined as "an appearance of truth or reason, credible,
believable, worthy of confidence."

The Random House College

2 Similar inconsistencies are also dealt with by the
State unconvincingly. For example, the State defends Mrs. Rains'
belated claim that she gave the name of Andy Quintana to police
during the initial call reporting the crime, by pointing out that
the police officers who stopped Mr. Quintana in the truck did not
contradict Mrs. Rains responding only that they could not recall.
Brief of Respondent at 20 n.7. That assertion is untenable because,
had the police possessed the name of Mr. Quintana as the
perpetrator, they would not have let him leave freely while
impounding the vehicle (R. 118 at 47; R. 119 at 5, 13). The State
also suggests that the inconsistency in clothing description is
trivial because Mr. Quintana could have returned home and changed
his shorts. Brief of Respondent at 20 n.6. That explanation is
disputed by the record as the testimony disclosed that Mr. Quintana
did not even own a pair of shorts fitting the description given by
Mrs. Rains (R. 119 at 26).
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Dictionary/ revised edition at 1018 (1984).

When pressed on

cross-examination, Mrs. Rains was unable to state with any
specificity how she knew Mr. Quintana nor how she recognized the
person on the porch of the John home as Mr. Quintana.

See

Addendum E of Appellant's Opening Brief to support that premise.
Accordingly, Mrs. Rains' testimony is implausible because it lacks
the appearance of truth or reason; it lacks credibility and
believability and is unworthy of confidence.

The State's attempt to

explain away the inaccuracies of the testimony and to salvage the
same as plausible is simply too demanding from this evidence.
The evidence presented at trial is insufficient such that
reasonable jurors must have entertained a reasonable doubt that
Mr. Quintana committed the crimes for which he was convicted.
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

This Court should

accordingly remand the case to the district court with an order
dismissing the charges against Mr. Quintana.

POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN SUBMITTING INSTRUCTION NO. 19 TO THE JURY
OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF MR. QUINTANA.
Mr. Quintana relies on the arguments presented in his
opening brief calling for reversal of the convictions on these
grounds.

Brief of Appellant at 24-32.

Mr. Quintana responds

briefly herein to indicate that the State's reliance on State v.
Johnson, 745 P.2d 452 (Utah 1987), is inappropriate.

Brief of

Respondent at 27. The Court in Johnson relied on State v. Smith,
726 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1986) to reach its decision.
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State v. Johnson,

745 P.2d at 456.
present case.

Smith, however, is distinguishable from the

See argument in Opening Brief of Appellant,

Point IIIB at 29-30.

Mr. Quintana urges that State v. Turner, 736

P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987), rather than State v. Johnson, is
controlling.

See Opening Brief of Appellant, Point IIIB at 30-32.

He, therefore, continues to urge reversal on the grounds asserted
herein.

CONCLUSION
For any and all of the foregoing reasons, Appellant,
Andrew R. Quintana, requests that this Court reverse his conviction
and remand this case to the district court with an order dismissing
the charges or requiring a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this / I '

^
day of June, 1989.

^LYNN R. BROV*1
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

!HARD G. UDAY
Attorney for Defendai
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ppellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, RICHARD G. UDAY, hereby certify that eight copies of
the foregoing will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400
Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 and
four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 this /f -~ day of Jawi, 1989.

DELIVERED by

this

of June, 1989.
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